Synthetic speech detection using phase information by Saratxaga Couceiro, Ibon et al.
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com 
Speech Communication 
Special Issue: Phase-Aware Signal Processing in Speech Communication 
Synthetic Speech Detection Using Phase Information 
Ibon Saratxaga
a
, Jon Sanchez*
a
, Zhizheng Wu
b
, Inma Hernaez
a
 
aUniversity of the Basque Country, UPV- EHU, Spain 
bThe Centre for Speech Technology Research (CSTR), University of Edinburgh, UK 
Abstract 
Taking advantage of the fact that most of the speech processing techniques neglect the phase information, we seek to 
detect phase perturbations in order to prevent synthetic impostors attacking Speaker Verification systems. Two Synthetic 
Speech Detection (SSD) systems that use spectral phase related information are reviewed and evaluated in this work: one 
based on the Modified Group Delay (MGD), and the other based on the Relative Phase Shift, (RPS). A classical module-
based MFCC system is also used as baseline. Different training strategies are proposed and evaluated using both real 
spoofing samples and copy-synthesized signals from the natural ones, aiming to alleviate the issue of getting real data to 
train the systems. The recently published ASVSpoof2015 database is used for training and evaluation. Performance with 
completely unrelated data is also checked using synthetic speech from the Blizzard Challenge as evaluation material. The 
results prove that phase information can be successfully used for the SSD task even with unknown attacks. 
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1. Introduction 
In speech processing, in speech synthesis and analysis areas alike, phase information has been traditionally 
discarded for most of the conventional applications. The spectral module information is highly correlated with 
the perceptual features of the speech and there are well established techniques to process them. Phase 
information has subtler perceptual effects  (Alsteris and Paliwal, 2007) (Saratxaga et al., 2012) and tricky 
features like wrapping make it more difficult to model and process. 
This unawareness for phase information in most speech processing techniques can indeed be exploited to 
detect such a processing on speech, tracing the unintended perturbations of the natural phase patterns left 
behind by this processing. One particular case where detecting natural speech manipulations can be critical is 
the speaker verification field. 
The first speaker verification (SV) systems tried to resolve the problem of detecting if a voice was certainly 
from a claimant speaker and not from other (Rosenberg, 1976). The improvement of the SV systems allowed a 
high success rate solving the problem of naive speaker verification, but the parallel advance in speech 
manipulation techniques has posed a new menace to these systems: impostors forging speech signals that 
imitate a particular speaker’s voice. This threat was first pointed by (Pellom and Hansen, 1999) and (Masuko 
et al., 2000), and has received more and more attention in literature as new voice adaptation and 
transformation techniques have made more feasible to mimic a speaker’s voice with less and less material 
from the original speaker. A detailed survey is published in (Wu et al., 2015). 
Nowadays two are the main speech processing techniques that allow the creation of synthetic speech 
spoofing signals: First, the statistical speech synthesizers (Yoshimura et al., 1999) (Tokuda et al., 2002) using 
voices adapted to a particular speaker (Yamagishi et al., 2009) even with minimum quality material 
(Yamagishi et al., 2010). Second, the voice conversion (VC) techniques (Jin et al., 2008), (Kinnunen et al., 
2012). Both techniques can be used to generate spoofing signals that can successfully deceive state-of-the-art 
SV systems with false acceptance rates (FAR) around 80% for synthetic speech and 5% for VC.  
A number of countermeasures have been proposed to these attacks. In (Satoh et al., 2001), a 
countermeasure based on the average inter-frame difference was proposed to discriminate between natural and 
synthetic speech from an HMM-based speech synthesis system. Another similar countermeasure which also 
use an average pair-wise distance between consecutive frames was proposed to detect voice-converted speech 
(Alegre et al., 2013a). Rather than capturing the inter-frame distortions, in (Wu et al., 2013) and (Alegre et al., 
2013b), modulation-based features and local binary pattern-based features were proposed to utilize long-term 
spectro-temporal information for synthetic speech detection. In (Sizov et al., 2015), a countermeasure which 
uses  the same front-end as ASV was proposed to discriminate natural and voice-converted speech. 
Above countermeasures which derive features from magnitude spectra work well for the specific attacks. 
Phase-based countermeasures proposed by the authors of this work have been used for both synthetic and 
voice-converted speech detection. In (Wu et al., 2012) synthetic speech detectors (SSD) based on cosine 
normalized phase and modified-group delay (MGD) (Yegnanarayana and Murthy, 1992) are evaluated with 
converted spoofing signals. In (Wu et al., 2013), modulation spectrum derived from the modified group delay 
spectrum was used for synthetic speech detection. These works have confirmed the effectiveness of phase 
information in detecting synthetic speech with matched vocoder. 
Relative Phase Shift (RPS) representation (Saratxaga et al., 2009) for the harmonic phase has also be used 
to build SSD systems aimed to detect spoofing signals created with adapted synthetic voices (De Leon et al., 
2011) (De Leon et al., 2012) with good results. The initial works were focused on evaluating the actual 
capability of the RPSs to detect the phase modifications due to the synthetic generation of the spoofing 
signals. Consequently synthesized impostors were used to model the spoofing attacks. This approach has the 
double downside of requiring the adaptation of synthetic voices to generate the spoofing samples, and, more 
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important, using particular attacks to train the synthetic models yields that their performance will be attack-
dependent, and they will not be able to detect spoofing signals created with another attacking technique. 
Once the validity of the RPS based SSD was demonstrated, the problem of avoiding attack dependence of 
the SSD was addressed in (Sanchez et al., 2014) (Sanchez et al., 2015). In these works, the authors analyze the 
use of copy-synthesized signals to create the imposter models. This way, the models are not dependent on the 
particular features of a specific synthesizer, but they can detect any signal created with a vocoder. Multi-
vocoder models trained and tested with completely unrelated signals were evaluated with good results. 
 Recently the work in this area has been promoted by the ASVSpoof2015, the Automatic Speaker 
Verification Spoofing and Countermeasures Challenge (Wu et al., 2014). The participants were invited to 
submit the results of independent SSD modules for evaluation. Spoofing detection systems were tested with a 
database (the so-called ASVSpoof database), containing different spoofing techniques such as speech 
synthesis and voice conversion. The performance of the different systems was assessed by the organization 
using standard metrics. This database has been made available to the public, and we are using it in this work. 
In this paper we review and evaluate the performance of a MGD based and a RPS based SSD system, 
benchmarking them against a module information based (MFCC) baseline system. We analyze the optimal use 
of training material comparing the strategy of using “real” spoofing signals versus using copy-synthesis 
signals from the natural ones. The performance of the system with completely unknown signals is also 
evaluated using a completely unrelated set of signals from the Blizzard Challenge (Black and Tokuda, 2005), 
the most popular international event for TTS system evaluations, where independent participants build 
synthetic voices using a common speech corpus and send some samples to be evaluated. They are, 
undoubtedly, a representative sample of the current technology in speech synthesis, and, consequently, of the 
kind of likely spoofing technique. 
Furthermore, the tests with a completely unrelated database, as the Blizzard Challenge one, introduces the 
channel-mismatch issue for spoofing detection. While in the ASVSpoof Challenge the same recording channel 
is assumed for every signal, the channel information of Blizzard Challenge data is different from ASVSpoof 
data. The robustness to the channel of the different SSDs has been little studied in literature and will be 
analyzed in this work for the proposed systems.  
The paper is organized as follows. First, the phase representation and parameterization methods – RPS and 
MGD – are described. Then, in section 3, the Synthetic Speech Detection System is described. 4th section is 
devoted to describe the databases used in both the training and test phases, and in the 5
th
 section the evaluation 
experiments are detailed. Finally, some conclusions are drawn. 
2. Phase representation and parameterization. 
We will evaluate two different phase-based systems: the Relative Phase Shift (RPS), based on the phase 
shift of the harmonic components of the speech signal, and the Modified Group Delay (MGD), which includes 
both magnitude and phase related information. Both systems are described below. 
2.1. Relative Phase Shift (RPS) 
The Relative Phase Shift (RPS) is a representation for the phase information of a harmonic speech signal. 
The representation was derived in (Saratxaga et al., 2009), but a brief description is provided in this section.  
2.1.1. Definition and derivation 
 
4 Author name / Speech Communication 00 (2012) 000–000 
RPS is a representation for the harmonic phase. Harmonic analysis models each frame of a signal by means 
of a sum of sinusoids harmonically related to the pitch or fundamental frequency. 
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where N is the number of bands, Ak the amplitudes, φk(t) the instantaneous phases, f0 the pitch or 
fundamental frequency and θk is the initial phase shift of the k-th sinusoid. The instantaneous phase is 
composed of two terms: the so-called “linear component” (depending on the analysis time instant and the 
frequency of the harmonic) and the initial phase shift term. This complex dependency makes the 
instantaneous phase difficult to use for certain purposes (most notably for pattern analysis and statistical 
modeling). 
The RPS representation consists in calculating the phase shift between every harmonic and the 
fundamental component (k=1) at a specific point of the fundamental period, namely the point where φ1=0. 
This does not imply that the analysis has to be done at that specific time (i.e. pitch synchronous), by the 
contrary, assuming local stationarity, the RPS value can be calculated at any time analysis instant. Let us 
consider two sinusoidal harmonic components like: 
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For the RPS ψ we have to calculate the phase shift in the instant to the closest instant before the analysis point 
when φ1(to)=0, as  
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )a k o o k ot t t t        (5) 
 
Assuming local stationarity, we can extrapolate the value of the instantaneous phase of the k-th harmonic. If 
we use principal values for the phases for simplicity, φ1(to)=0 and we can obtain to from (4): 
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From (4) we also know that:  
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Combining (4), (6) and (7) in (5), we have: 
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And so we obtain the RPS transformation for the k-th harmonic component, whose graphical interpretation is 
shown in Figure 1: 
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Figure 1: Graphical interpretation of the RPS transformation: for an analysis instant ta the RPS of k is the phase shift 
of that component with respect to the fundamental component at the point where the period of the fundamental component 
starts (to). 
Equation (9) defines the RPS transformation which allows computing the RPSs (ψk) from the instantaneous 
phases at any point (ta) of the signal. The RPS values are wrapped to the [-π, π] interval.  
The RPS transformation intrinsically removes the linear phase term, thus resulting in a magnitude that 
remains stable as long as the phase shift relations of the components (and subsequently the waveform) do not 
change. These stable patterns allow the phase structure to arise, as is shown in Fig. 2 where instantaneous 
phase (a) and RPS values (b) of a voiced speech signal /aeiou/ (c) can be compared. It is worth noting that 
there is no useful phase information in the unvoiced frames of the speech. 
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Figure 2: Phasegrams of a voiced speech segment with five continuous vowels. (a) Instantaneous phases. (b)Relative 
phase shift (c) Signal waveform. 
2.1.2. Parameterization 
Although the RPS patterns look very definite, the RPS values are not suitable for statistical modeling. 
Variable numbers of values depending on the number of harmonics, high dimensionality, wrapping 
discontinuities, etc. make it necessary to apply additional parameterization.  
In (Saratxaga et al., 2010) it was described a method to obtain a reduced parameter set out of the RPS 
values, the so called DCT-mel-RPS parameterization. This parameterization reduces the variable number of 
raw RPS values to a constant number of parameters and is well suited for statistical modeling. 
To obtain the parameters, the differences of the unwrapped RPS values are filtered with a mel filter bank 
(48 filters) and a discrete cosine transform (DCT) is applied to the resulting sequence. The DCT is truncated 
to 20 values and the averaged value of the slope of the unwrapped RPS values is also included. The Δ and ΔΔ 
values of this vector are calculated which leads to a total of 63 phase-based parameters, calculated only for 
voiced frames, usually with frame rates of 5-10ms. 
2.2. MGD 
The modified group delay (MGD) feature is a representation of complex Fourier transform spectrum, and 
contains both magnitude and phase spectra information. It has been used for speech recognition in (Zhu and 
Paliwal, 2004) and (Hegde et al., 2007). This section briefly introduces MGD feature. 
Given a speech signal x(n), the complex spectrum representation X(ω) can be obtained through short-time 
Fourier transform. The complex spectrum X(ω) has two parts: real part XR(ω) and imaginary part XI(ω). The 
power spectrum which derives the popular Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC) is represented as 
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|X(ω)|2. To extract modified group delay spectrum, we define Y(ω) as the complex spectrum of nx(n), which 
is a re-scaled signal of x(n). The modified group delay spectrum  τρ,γ(ω) is defined as, 
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where XR(ω) and XI(ω) are the real and imaginary parts of X(ω), respectively, YR(ω) and YI(ω) are the real 
and imaginary parts of  Y(ω), |S(ω)|2 is the smoothed power spectrum corresponding to |X(ω)|2, and ρ and γ   
are two weighted variables to control the shape of the modified group delay spectrum. In practice, |S(ω)|2  is 
obtained by cepstrally smoothing the power spectrum |X(ω)|2. This can be achieved through two steps: 
 a) apply discrete cosine transform (DCT) on the power spectrum and  
 b) then pass the first 30 DCT coefficients to inverse discrete cosine transform (IDCT) to reconstruct a new 
smoothed spectrum.  
The reason to use the smoothed spectrum rather than the original spectrum is to make the modified group 
delay spectrum much more stable (Hegde et al., 2007). A spectrogram-like graphical representation of this 
magnitude is shown in Figure 3. 
With the modified group delay spectrum, we can compute modified group delay cepstral coefficients 
(MGDCC) as feature representations for modeling. The cepstral feature can be computed through the 
following steps: 
a) Apply Fourier transform to the signal x(n) and its re-scaled version nx(n) to compute the spectrum X(ω) 
and Y(ω), respectively. 
b) Compute the cepstrally smoothed spectrum |S(ω)|2 for the power spectrum |X(ω)|2. 
c) Compute modified group delay spectrum using Equation (10) and (11). 
e) Apply DCT on the modified group delay spectrum to calculate the MGDCC. 
The two controlling variable ρ and γ are tuned on the development set for better representation performance. 
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Figure 3: MGD spectrogram of a voiced speech segment with five continuous vowels.  
3. Synthetic Speech Detectors (SSD) 
In this work we will compare different Synthetic Speech Detectors (SSD) systems. The purpose of the SSD 
systems is to discriminate between natural speech signals and synthetically generated ones. SSD blocks are 
intended to work jointly with speaker verification (SV) systems, trying to detect synthetically generated 
speaker adapted impostor signals that can cheat the SV system. If the SSD system requires knowing the 
supposed speaker identity to perform the classification task (i.e. it uses speaker dependent models) then the 
SSD will necessarily be placed after the SV system to check the signals accepted as claimants by the SV 
system. If previous knowledge of the speaker identity is not necessary (i.e. speaker independent models), the 
SSD module can be inserted before or after the SV system. This is the case of the systems analyzed in this 
work. 
Figure 4 shows the main structure of an SSD system. The system is a binary classifier. During the training 
phase, parametric models for both natural speech (λhuman) and synthetic speech (λsynth) are created. Then, 
candidate parameter vectors are evaluated.  
To perform the synthetic speech detection task, the system will test a candidate vector sequence 
Y={y1,…,yN} of length N against both natural speech and synthetic speech models to get the corresponding 
likelihood values p(Y|λhuman) and p(Y|λsynth). Then, the log likelihood ratio Λ is calculated as  
human synth( ) log ( ) log ( )Y p Y p Y          (12) 
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The candidate is considered human if it exceeds a certain decision threshold θ which was set to the equal 
error rate (EER) point in the experiments. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: SSD system structure. 
 
In this paper three different systems are referred, with different parameterization and modelling techniques. 
The first one, MFCC, based on the spectral module information, is included as a baseline.  The second one, 
MGD has been successfully used for SSD experiments (Wu et al., 2013). The third one, RPS, has been also 
previously tested in different spoofing scenarios (Sanchez et al., 2014) (Sanchez et al., 2015). In this paper, 
both phase-based systems will be facing new spoofing experiments and compared. 
 
3.1. Natural and synthetic models 
In this work, we focus on feature-based countermeasures rather than model-based approaches. Hence, we 
use the classic GMM-based classifier for the detectors. The GMM-based classifiers have 1024 Gaussian 
components for the MFCC and MGD models and 2048 components for the RPS based models. The natural 
models are trained on the training data of human speech defined by ASVSpoof 2015 protocol, while the 
synthetic models are trained on the training data of the five known attacks (also as defined in ASVSpoof 2015 
protocol) , and/or copy-synthesis speech as it will be described in section 5. 
Input Voice 
Parameterization 
Y 
p(Y|λhuman) 
p(Y|λsynth) 
Natural model 
Synthetic model 
Decision 
Λ(Y)≥θ 
Output 
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4. Training and evaluation databases 
4.1. ASVSpoof Database 
This database was created for the Automatic Speaker Verification Spoofing and Countermeasures 
Challenge  (Wu et al., 2014). 
The natural speech information was collected from 106 speakers (61 female and 45 male). There are no 
remarkable channel or background noise effects. Taking these genuine human signals as a basis, different 
spoofing algorithms are selected to create the spoofed speech. The signals are originally sampled at 16 kHz, 
and that is how they are used to calculate MFCC and MGD parameters, for DCT-mel-RPS they have been 
downsampled to 8 kHz before being parameterized. 
In order to perform training, evaluation and testing, the whole data base is divided in three datasets. 
Different speakers are selected for each of the sets. The number of speakers and in each dataset is illustrated 
in Table 1.  
Table 1: Number speakers and utterances in the different datasets (Wu et al., 2015b) 
 #Speakers #Utterances 
Subset Male Female Genuine Spoofed 
Training 10 15 3750 12625 
Development 15 20 3497 49875 
Evaluation 20 26 9404 184000 
 
4.1.1. Training data 
 
25 speakers, 15 female and 10 male, were selected to make up the training data set. Together with the 
genuine voice utterances, the spoofed versions are also part of the set, created by means of five different 
systems: three of them voice conversion based (including frame selection and spectral slope techniques, and a 
publicly available voice conversion toolkit within the Festvox system
†
) and two speech synthesis algorithms 
(both implemented using HMMs and HTS
‡
).  
4.1.2. Development data 
The second subset of the database, intended to be used for development, takes 3497 genuine utterances  
from 35 speakers (20 female, 15 male), and 49875 spoofed signals, generated using the same five algorithms 
that take part in the training set.  
4.1.3. Copy-synthesis 
Trying to get a more universal model, the same technique as in (Sanchez et al., 2014) is used with both the 
train and development sets: The human signals are copy-synthesized (at the original 16kHz sampling 
 
 
†
 http://www.festvox.org 
‡
 http://hts.sp.nitech.ac.jp 
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frequency) using three state-of-the-art vocoders that are widely used in statistical speech processing 
technologies: AHOCODER (Erro et al., 2014), STRAIGHT (Kawahara et al., 1999) and MLSA (Yoshimura 
et al., 1999). These additional three signal sets of vocoded “impostors” are used for synthetic model training 
in some of the experiments, as described in section 5.  
4.1.4. Evaluation data 
In the evaluation dataset genuine and spoofed signals are included, getting a total of 184000 signals with 
the same recording conditions as those from the other sets. In this case, 10 different algorithms are used to 
generate de spoofed signals: the same five that were used for the other sets and 5 different ones, intentionally 
selected to test the generalization capability of the tested SSD system to face previously unseen attacks. 
Among these unknown algorithms there is a system (S10) that uses unit selection synthesis, a completely 
different technology (not based on vocoder parameterization and statistical modeling). This technology was 
intentionally set aside for the model training material as it can hardly be used for spoofing purposes due to the 
big amount of signals of the target speaker required to create a quality voice.  
4.2. The Blizzard 2012 Database 
In order to test the SSD systems with signals completely unrelated with the training material, it was 
necessary to obtain a representative number of state-of-the-art TTS systems. The Blizzard Challenge (King, 
2014) was an interesting choice.  
In the field of TTS system design, The Blizzard Challenge is the most popular international event for 
evaluations. All participants must use a common speech corpus to build a synthetic voice using their TTS 
systems. Then, some samples of this voice are submitted, so that they can be used in a common subjective 
evaluation, performed by a large pool of listeners. Undoubtedly, the TTS systems presented to the Blizzard 
Challenge are a representative sample of the state-of-the-art technology in speech synthesis.  
Every year, the Blizzard Challenge organizers distribute the listening evaluation: a set of human recordings 
and their counterparts synthesized by means of every TTS system that takes part. Since both human and 
synthetic signals are available, this database can be a good test field for SSD systems.  
A wide sample of TTS technologies is present at the Blizzard Challenge: the main groups are statistical or 
HMM based synthesizers, unit selection based systems and hybrid systems. This last type includes systems 
that, even using unit selection techniques to generate the speech signal, make use of statistical models in the 
unit selection process.  
In the experiments referred in this paper, we have used the listening evaluation data of the 2012 Blizzard 
Challenge (King and Karaiskos, 2012). It consists of 11 signal sets, each one with 209 utterances in US 
English. The set designate A contains the reference human signals, and the system named B is not a 
participant but a standard unit-selection-based benchmark system. Among the others, we can find statistical 
systems like E, H and K, unit selections systems like F, G and I, hybrid like C and D and a diphone 
concatenation system, J.  
5. Experiments and Results 
We have evaluated the phase-based SSD systems in two experiments using two evaluation sets, as 
explained in the previous section. For both of them, the systems have been trained with the training and 
development sets of the ASVspoof DB, including additional signals generated by copy-synthesis of the 
human subset, using the three vocoders explained in 4.1.3. In the first experiment, the test material belongs to 
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the same database as the training material (the ASVspoof DB) whereas in the second, a completely unrelated 
evaluation set is used, in order to test the ability of the SSD systems facing completely unknown impostors. 
5.1. Evaluation with the ASVSpoof Database 
In this experiment the models trained with the training and development material of the ASVspoof DB 
have been tested with the evaluation part of that database. While the human model has remained the same in 
the entire experiment, three different training strategies for the synthetic models have been tested (see Table 
1):  
 M1: Synthetic model developed with the synthetic material provided in the training and development 
set of the database. 
 M2: Synthetic model developed with newly generated synthetic material by copy-synthesis of the 
human set using three different vocoders: AHOCODER, STRAIGHT and MLSA. 
 M3: Synthetic model developed combining the material from M1 and M2. 
 
As mentioned before, the evaluation set is composed of human signals and spoofing signals generated with 
10 algorithms, 5 of which are included in the training material. The other five are “unknown”: 4 of them are 
VC systems with STRAIGHT as vocoder. The 10
th
 system is a unit selection based synthesizer and it is out of 
the scope of the systems trained in this work.  
The results of this experiment are shown in tables 2 and 3. In order to avoid the bias in the average EERs 
due to the unsurprisingly bad performance of the unit selection based system (S10), we show averaged values 
for the rest of the systems (*-S10 columns). We also assume that the S10 values are excluded from the 
analysis in the following lines.  
The MFCC baseline gets some decent results with EER around 2%, showing that the classification task is 
not very demanding for this database.  
It is also remarkable that there is no significant difference between known and unknown systems (always 
excluding the 10
th
 system based in unit selection). For all the systems the performance falls around 10-20% 
from known to unknown systems when trained with spoofing impostor samples (M1). But actually, with M2 
training set (where all the systems are unknown) the performance falls more than for other training sets. That 
is to say: the slight performance difference cannot be attributed to prior knowledge of the attack method but to 
other features of particular spoofing systems included in the “unknown” set that affect the performance. This 
is corroborated by the detailed results of table 3, where it can be seen most of the unknown systems are 
actually better detected than the known ones. Only the EER for the S6 system, which is particularly bad (for 
every training set, thus not depending on being known or unknown) makes the average ratio of the unknown 
systems worse.  
The results for the MGD system show a good performance for M1 and M3 training materials, but it 
degrades for M2 training set. MGD parameters seem to be more affected by the distortions introduced by the 
statistical modeling process required by real spoofing algorithms, which are not present in vocoded signals 
used in M2.  
RPS based systems get consistently good results in all the training sets and attacking algorithms as can be 
seen in Table 3, with values well below 1% EER for all the training sets. 
Regarding the effect of the different training strategies with RPS parameters, using the attack samples to 
train the synthetic model of the classifier (M1) performs better than the other strategies. M2, using vocoded 
material to train the models, produces a poorer but still decent performance, in the same magnitude order than 
the other strategies. The hypothetical benefit of M2 strategy being capable of producing better results for 
unknown systems is not shown in the results. Unfortunately, provided the above-mentioned small 
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differentiation between the known and unknown systems, we cannot state whether this generalization feature 
is or is not true.  
M3 strategy, with models created by combination of attack samples and copy-synthesized samples, gets 
good performance, very close to the M1. Actually, both classifiers are not statistically significant according to 
the McNemar test (p=0.41). It gives small improvements for some of the “unknown” systems (S8 and S9). 
Table 2. Training and evaluation subsets for the different strategies for model training. 
 Training Evaluation 
Model Human signals Synthetic signals Human signals Synthetic signals 
M1 7247 62500 9404 184000 
M2 7247 21741 (7247x3) 9404 184000 
M3 7247 84241 9404 184000 
 
Table 3. EER in percentage of the different system types tested against the ASVProof database. 
SSD System Known Systems Unknown 
Systems-S10 
Unknown 
Systems 
All-S10 All 
MFCC M1 1.8815 2.1070 9.0998 1.9817 5.4907 
MFCC M2 8.9816 11.6447 18.0683 10.1652 13.5250 
MFCC M3 1.9262 2.8537 10.0104 2.3384 5.9683 
MGD M1 0.9270 1.3086 8.9103 1.0966 4.9187 
MGD M2 9.0414 7.4304 14.2777 8.3254 11.6596 
MGD M3 2.4529 2.7788 10.2569 2.5977 6.3549 
RPS M1 0.1274 0.1562 8.8185 0.1402 4.4730 
RPS M2 0.5294 0.6901 10.0970 0.6008 5.3132 
RPS M3 0.1361 0.1669 9.1261 0.1498 4.6311 
 
Table 4. EER in percentage of the different systems tested against the ASVProof database. 
SSD System S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
MFCC M1 0.1102 8.4556 0.0360 0.0438 0.7621 1.5449 3.4747 2.4740 0.9343 37.0711 
MFCC M2 5.0327 13.1417 8.9981 8.9981 8.7375 11.2048 16.3206 9.4169 9.6362 43.7628 
MFCC M3 0.5471 7.6091 0.0690 0.1019 1.3040 2.1734 4.3412 3.1157 1.7846 38.6373 
MGD M1 0.1866 1.8559 0.2446 0.2849 2.0629 2.4006 0.7891 1.3186 0.7260 39.3174 
MGD M2 1.4017 4.7303 7.3400 6.9395 24.7957 19.2032 2.8205 3.3713 4.3265 41.6672 
MGD M3 0.4113 2.5331 0.9455 0.9500 7.4247 6.5415 1.0769 1.9259 1.5708 40.1692 
RPS M1  0.2661 0.1695 0.0217 0.0360 0.1439 0.5147 0.0080 0.0912 0.0108 43.4680 
RPS M2 1.0478 0.7359 0.1625 0.1437 0.5571 2.0239 0.1286 0.2834 0.3243 47.7249 
RPS M3 0.2814 0.1770 0.0152 0.0363 0.1707 0.5711 0.0108 0.0755 0.0101 44.9628 
 
14 Author name / Speech Communication 00 (2012) 000–000 
5.2. Using the Blizzard 2012 Database 
The second experiment aims to analyze the performance of the SSD systems when they are confronted 
with completely unrelated signals, both natural and spoofed. Besides the unknown spoofing algorithm used, 
these signals would be acquired in a completely different channel, and thus the intrinsic robustness of the 
different SSDs to the channel-mismatch issue will also be evaluated. 
 As mentioned before, we will use the Blizzard 2012 Database with 10 voice adapted TTS (B-K) plus the 
natural voice. 3 of the TTS in this Challenge (E, H and K) are statistical synthesizers which use HMM based 
models of certain speech parameters which, in the synthesis phase, will feed a vocoder to produce the speech 
signal.  
The rest of the systems use unit selection or hybrid technologies for synthesis, which means that they 
concatenate segments of natural signals and therefore do not use any vocoder. As was the case with S10 
algorithm in the previous experiment, these systems are out of the scope of the SSDs evaluated here, and 
should been addressed specifically in future works. On the other hand, unit selection based technology might 
not be suitable for spoofing in some applications which require live conversation (call-center applications, for 
instance), as unit selection technology requires a relative large speech database to produce natural speech, and 
can be easily detected by human ears (Wester et al., 2015).  
In this experiment all the SSDs and the three training strategies have been evaluated, and the results are 
shown in table 5. The EER of the system is obtained by testing every synthetic subset against the human 
counterpart.  
Table 5. EER in percentage of the different systems tested against the ASVSpoof database. 
SSD System B C D E F G H I J K 
MFCC M1 38.2775 44.0191 17.2249 0.0000 27.7512 28.7081 3.8278 22.0096 62.2010 0.0000 
MFCC M2 48.8038 48.8038 52.6316 0.9569 29.1866 35.4067 18.1818 24.8804 14.8325 2.8708 
MFCC M3 43.5407 45.9330 20.5742 0.0000 25.3589 29.1866 3.8278 22.0096 10.0478 0.0000 
MGD M1 59.8086 73.2057 8.6124 2.3923 78.4689 79.4258 7.6555 63.1579 42.5837 5.2632 
MGD M2 62.6794 23.4450 8.1340 5.7416 44.4976 32.5359 3.3493 17.7033 23.4450 3.3493 
MGD M3 59.8086 37.7990 5.2632 3.8278 60.7656 54.0670 3.8278 33.0144 27.2727 3.8278 
RPS M1 49.2823 69.3780 40.6699 0.0000 69.3780 2.8708 0.0000 32.0574 72.2488 0.0000 
RPS M2 34.9282 58.3732 11.0048 0.0000 66.0287 2.8708 0.0000 19.1388 6.2201 0.0000 
RPS M3 40.6699 61.7225 15.7895 0.0000 63.1579 3.8278 0.0000 23.9234 14.3541 0.0000 
 
The first evident result is that none of the systems or the strategies is able to correctly detect the unit 
selection based systems. This is consistent with the results of the S10 system in the previous database. The 
error level is comparable in both experiments, which means that it is not due to the signals being unknown or 
to the channel-mismatch, but it reflects the intrinsic inability to detect unit selection systems without such 
samples in the model training. 
Regarding the vocoder based synthesis systems the results depend on the system. The baseline SSD gets 
good results for some TTS but its performance depends upon the training strategy and system. The MGD 
based system seems to be sensitive to the channel mismatch problem, because the detection rate is not so 
good. The RPS based system, by the contrary, obtains consistent error-free classification regardless the TTS 
or the training strategy, suggesting robustness to the channel and attacking system variation. The average 
errors for vocoder based and unit selection based systems is shown in table 6. 
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Table 6. Average EER in percentage for the different types of synthetic signals. 
SSD System Average vocoder based 
systems (E,H,K) 
Average unit selection & 
hybrid systems 
Average 
All  
MFCC M1 1.2759 34.3131 24.4019 
MFCC M2 7.3365 36.3636 27.6555 
MFCC M3 1.2759 28.0930 20.0478 
MGD M1 5.1037 57.8947 42.0574 
MGD M2 4.1467 30.3486 22.4880 
MGD M3 3.8278 39.7129 28.9474 
RPS M1 0.0000 47.9836 33.5885 
RPS M2 0.0000 28.3664 19.8565 
RPS M3 0.0000 31.9207 22.3445 
 
Regarding the training strategy, the experiment shows diverse behaviours depending on the SSD and the type 
of impostors.  For the baseline system the M3 strategy, combining training samples from spoofing signals and 
vocoded ones seems the best approach. Conversely, for the MGD and the RPS systems the M2 strategy (with 
just vocoded signals) seems to be the best (attending to the average EER for all the systems). This result is 
mainly due to performance with the unit selection systems, which, although very bad in all the cases, is better 
for the M2 training strategy. It can be hypothesised that models trained with attacking samples (M1) are too 
specific to capture the features of other synthesis techniques, while vocoded signals, being of higher quality 
and closer to the natural signals produce more general models better suited to detect unknown signals.  
Considering all the results, there is one interesting observation worth noting: RPS which uses purely phase 
information achieves similar performance by using different training conditions. On the other hand, MFCC or 
MGD which also consider magnitude information varies a lot. It means that the magnitude spectrum is 
distorted a lot after the modelling process by speech synthesis or voice conversion what does not happen for 
the vocoded speech, which produces very high quality synthetic signals. It is possible that MGD and MFCC 
systems are actually modelling the distortions in the magnitude spectra produced by the speech processing 
technology.  
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have reviewed two phase based methods to detect spoofing using synthetic speech: both 
are based in GMM models for natural and synthetic signals but one of them uses Modified Group Delay 
parameters to train the models while the other uses DCT-mel-RPS parameters. We also use a MFCC based 
system as baseline. We have focused on attacks created with speaker adapted synthetic speech and voice 
conversion systems which use parameter manipulation followed by speech generation using vocoders, as they 
are the most feasible methods to generate the spoofing signals. 
We have evaluated these systems using two databases, with training material coming only from one of 
them in order to evaluate the systems with completely unrelated signals (including acquisition channel). This 
evaluation intends to simulate real application scenarios and to assess the generalization abilities of these 
countermeasures. 
We have also evaluated different training strategies, aiming to address the problem of obtaining suitable 
training data for the spoofing signal model. Hence, we have developed models from “real” spoofing signals 
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but also with copy-synthesizes signals using three of the most common vocoders used in current adapted 
synthetic speech and voice conversion systems.  
The results show that the systems can achieve a good performance, which is maintained even with 
completely unrelated signals coming from other database. Both phase-based systems improve the baseline 
results. The best training strategy appears to be using spoofing samples, but adding vocoded signals can help 
improving results with unknown signals. For the RPS based classifier using both types of signals to train the 
model has no significant downside. More extensive evaluation is needed with different attacking technologies 
and signals to definitely asses the convenience of such training strategies. 
Although they are not the target of the SSDs developed in this work, we have kept the unit selection 
systems in the test material. As it was expected, the SSD systems trained with vocoder based synthetic signals 
do not work with unit selection based ones. It has to be studied if phase based systems like the ones here 
presented, trained with appropriate signals, and could model this kind of synthetic impostors. 
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